

NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

OF CONSEQUENCE TO GEORGE BUSH AND CONSERVATIVES

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POLITICAL OVERVIEW

With National Elections less than four months away, and a surprising polling lead by Governor Michael Dukakis over Vice President Bush, this paper is intended to provide a means for Vice President Bush to clarify his views on important national security issues, both publicly and privately. "The vision thing," in Vice President Bush's own words, may indeed be the principal reason for the polling disparity and Michael Dukakis' growing popularity and media attention. Despite a vast chasm of ideological differences between Bush and Dukakis, this disparity and perception has NOT been conveyed to the American public. Michael Dukakis has been able to utilize the themes of LEADERSHIP, VISION, EFFICIENCY and CLEAN GOVERNMENT to his advantage, and has been able to portray himself with moderation. It is known that in U.S. politics, he who captures the center becomes the winner; and the center--Richard Nixon's "Silent Majority"--leans toward the Conservative end of the political spectrum. This is Michael Dukakis' principal strategy, and he has succeeded in depicting himself "as conservative" as George Bush--which is a bold-faced lie, and a deception of the American People.

If Vice President Bush wishes to win in November, the areas of uncertainty need to be addressed and the true philosophical differences between George Bush and Michael

Dukakis must be established before the American electorate. Only after this is done will the choice be clear. Michael Dukakis' strategy for the National Election is well-reasoned, SIMPLE, and has great potential for success--as was his primary campaign strategy. Dukakis plans a very strong offensive based on attacking areas of vulnerability as well as traditional Republican strongholds. This applies to regional issues and disparities, voting blocs and issues. Dukakis can be expected to make a strong appeal to ethnic voters and "disaffected" voters; gain SOLID support from labor--a key to Ronald Reagan's victories, much to the Democrats surprise--since labor views Dukakis as a winner and is strongly mobilized to support him; and to make a strong play for support from within the business community--normally a Republican stronghold.

In order for George Bush to WIN, he must pre-emptively attack in these areas in order to negate Dukakis' strategy (immobilize the strategy--isolate the man). Furthermore, George Bush MUST TAKE HIS CAMPAIGN TO MIDDLE AMERICA--THE AMERICAN VOTERS--and demonstrate vividly the difference in philosophy and values (VISION and LEADERSHIP), between himself and Dukakis. American voters generally adhere to conservative principles, and it is for this reason that an organized Conservative movement, with its network of radio and television programs, newsletters, conferences and forums, and membership publications, all of which provides

grass-roots support, CAN and indeed MUST help. However, Conservatives have generally been unenthusiastic about George Bush and there are a number of reasons for this. This is partly due to personal animosities that arose mainly out of frustration over the perceived misunderstanding as to the true nature of the Conservative social agenda and other related matters. This is also partly due to gross uncertainty about George Bush's program for an assured American future--a reinvigorated America that Conservatives hope for.

Perhaps another reason why Conservatives are unenthusiastic about George Bush is that they sense a need for political leadership to bring about an end to the current moral confusion and disorder in America, and are uncertain as to how he would approach this issue. This is, of course, the main concern that underlies the Conservative social agenda, and coincidentally happens to be a major vulnerability of the Democratic Party that is not widely recognized and politically targetted. Conservatives, in general, feel that restoration of the moral order in America is an issue of fundamental importance, since it is the glue that holds the fabric of American society together--without which there can be no unity of purpose. This issue could be addressed in a separate paper, but it is wise to remember that moral order and moral values are the major underlying requirements of National Security, itself.

Conservatives have no idea as to where they will stand in a Bush Administration because they have little idea as to where George Bush stands on issues of importance to them; and the Vice President appears to have done little to court and encourage the support of this political element. There is no vested interest. It is said that if one is to help a man, it is best for that man to evidence a sentiment to help himself. Time is marching on, and it is getting late-- George Bush needs Conservative support, and he needs it NOW, not later; internecine warfare must NOT impede the Republican campaign. George Bush must clarify his vision for our nation's future and demonstrate the leadership qualities upon which his resume and campaign is based.

Michael Dukakis is completely unacceptable to Conservatives. The advice of more than one political analyst to George Bush is worth considering at this juncture: "If 1988 becomes a Republican vs. Democrat election, George Bush could lose badly; if it can be converted into a Conservative vs Liberal struggle, George Bush can yet win going away George Bush must now define his presidency before he gets there, if he ever hopes to get there Tell us why exactly America needs him as her next President." This is exactly why a strong alliance MUST be forged between the Vice President and Conservatives, and this would require a determined effort on the part of both the Vice President and Conservative

leaders. It is the purpose of this paper to suggest that such an effort be initiated by addressing national security issues in several face-to-face meetings between the Vice President and certain national security conservatives as a first phase, with domestic and social issues as a second phase. There is a political reason for this kind of approach, in that there appears to be greater commonality and room for accommodation on these issues.

Michael Dukakis has become politically viable primarily because he is the governor of a state--and a small one at that. He has had no experience in national security affairs and his lack of skills in this area constitute one of his main vulnerabilities--perhaps his only real vulnerability. Conversely, this should be one of the Vice President's strong points; after all, the primary function of the Federal Government is national security. This aspect could be heightened by a focus on the requirements for leadership of the Western world, and all which this entails.

A mechanism must be developed by which an enduring alliance will be forged and expanded between the Vice President and the Conservatives, and a joint approach centered on the National Security Strategy of the United States seems ideal for this purpose. What logically should follow from this would be the design of a "pronouncement strategy" so that the political rhetoric conforms with the

proposed actions. A number of innovative ideas have been developed in the last few years and are available. Whether they are used or not depends on George Bush's attitude toward "Winning or Losing." It is his decision to make, and Conservatives await his response. In this respect, George Bush's approach while chairing the Harris County Republican Party, as noted in his autobiography, Looking Forward, seems appropriate: "My theme was that we all shared basic conservative views, but to be effective we had to concentrate on tackling the Democrats, not each other." In UNITY there is STRENGTH--and it is "time for healing" between the Vice President and Conservatives.

In the words of the author of "Winning and Losing," the essence of POLITICAL CAMPAIGN STRATEGY AND TACTICS is a process of INTERACTION and ISOLATION in the moral, mental and physical domains. In this schema, the moral domain is by far the most powerful. This fits nicely both with the basic political activity George Bush should pursue and the organized Conservative movement's central message. It is in both the interest of George Bush and the Conservative movement that he pursue a strategy of interaction with Conservatives and the various other groups of Middle America that might now be neutral so as to isolate the mutual opponent--Michael Dukakis.

1) NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

This document is required by law to be submitted by the President to the Congress in January of each year so that it may serve as a guide to the budget process. One of its purposes is to overcome the historical deficiencies of the West, as noted by Jean-Francois Revel in his book How Democracies Perish as well as the national decision-making problems noted in Kevin P. Phillips' Post-Conservative America. With these factors in mind, Conservative participation in the preparation of this document for 1989 may serve as a unifying process, provided it is not treated as a pro forma exercise. In this respect, it would be most appropriate if the proposed Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in the forth-coming Bush Administration be tasked to head this kind of process.

For an improved document, a format along the following lines is suggested:

I GENERAL SURVEY

This should emphasize where we are and what is happening in our political, economic and social world. It should include not only the problems we face, but those people who are friends, allies, neutrals and adversaries on both the international and domestic scenes, and the context of these

relationships. It should not only weave political, economic, and social and security matters across both the international and domestic fronts, but also show the interactions of the domestic with the international arena and vice versa. For example, political friends can be economic or trade rivals, and questions will arise as to the impact on U.S. and Western national security interests due to such rivalry.

II COMPRESSION

This should identify and articulate the essential elements, relationships, or associations that flow from the General Survey above, to determine if there are any patterns to which we should attend, and how these patterns seem to play-out, unfold, or interact with one another.

III STRATEGIC TAPESTRY

Weave the above ideas, patterns, and interactions into our cultural values and national interest. Expand them into a strategic framework for realizing our objectives and goals (short-, mid-, and long-term), together with the implications this synthesis has with respect to the human and material resources required, and the tactical

concepts or means that will be consistent with this framework.

IV GUIDELINES

This document should serve as the guidelines to subordinate departments, agencies, unit commanders, etc., and should consist of a clear articulation of what is expected of them and why this is so. The how this is to be achieved should not be specified. On the other hand, be certain that subordinate departments, agencies, unit commanders, etc., are fully informed of any political, economic, social, etc., constraints to which they must adhere, since these constraints, in effect, are part of the overall strategic framework.

What follows are some of the contentious current issues that have a bearing on the National Security Strategy of the United States, even if not fully addressed in the document. However, because they are so contentious, they must form part of the unifying process and be addressed in a forthright manner.

2) SOVIET GLOBAL POLITICAL STRATEGY

For some unexplainable reason, there is no single official document in the U.S. Government that clearly addresses the matter of Soviet political strategy and tactics. Furthermore, there is no official training program devoted to this subject. As a result, there is no agreement among officials in the White House, the National Security Council staff, the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency that there IS such a thing as Soviet strategy and tactics, especially of the nature of Sun Tzu, and particularly when Soviet studies and literature document said Soviet strategy and tactics. Lacking such agreement within the U.S. Government, there is no established procedure for monitoring and evaluating changes in the most vital aspects of Soviet international behavior, that of its strategy and tactics. In other words, the Intelligence Community is not instructed by the White House or NSC to report changes in Soviet strategy and tactics, nor do such intelligence agencies as the CIA feel obligated to focus on Soviet strategy. Rather, the CIA focuses on almost everything else except that which really should be one of its central concerns. One example of this situation is the September 2, 1975 DIA report: "Detente in Soviet Strategy," the implications of which were completely ignored even by the White House itself. And because this situation exists within the Executive branch, the Congress is left almost

completely in ignorance on the subject and blindly seeks to assert greater authority in the administration of international affairs--normally the purview of the Chief Executive. Virtually nothing has been done about this situation during the current Administration. In fact, what strategic planning there was in the NSC was quietly reorganized out of existence in the early years of the Administration.

3) SOVIET GLOBAL DRUG WAR

There are sufficient documentable evidence and analysis that indicate the current drug scourge in America was a planned event, begun during the Korean War by China and expanded during the Vietnam War as a way to adversely affect not only the American armed forces, but also the domestic United States. Since these early years, it has been established that the Soviet Union has adopted drugs as a means of conducting political warfare and subversion against America and the West. There is evidence that suggests that during the Detente era, in the early 1970's, such information that indicated official communist nation sponsorship of drugs was distorted or otherwise suppressed. This applies particularly to both China and the Soviet Union: The Soviet Union can now manipulate drug traffic behind the scenes in such a way as to avoid direct blame, working as it does through other proxy nations. Evidence

indicates that many communist nations and their client states are involved in a concerted effort, and have devoted substantial resources to this kind of warfare. This analysis has been documented by countless Soviet Bloc, Cuban and Nicaraguan defectors and has survived the strict scrutiny of Congressional hearings and U.S. courts of law.

By some estimates, the United States is losing from \$60 - \$100 billion per annum outflow in cash due to the drug traffic, with attendant medical costs of another \$50 billion per annum. This is a hidden transfer of national wealth and resources, and is a national security scandal. A drain of such magnitude over many years could be another reason why the United States is becoming financially weakened and psychologically drained. This situation is somewhat similar to that which pertains to Soviet global political strategy: If the U.S. Government as a whole cannot reach agreement on the evidence, it has no certain way of dealing effectively with the hidden real sources of the problem--which are international in scope. Programs designed to throttle domestic consumption address only half of the problem; dealing with the other half requires major policy decisions--REAL and SERIOUS policy decisions which go to the roots of the problem.

4) SOVIET STRATEGIC PLAN of 1968

Apparently, there is no official of the U.S. Government that is willing to admit that such a plan should have any operative impact on U.S. policies. There are a number of possible reasons for this kind of situation. First, there is a suspicion that high-ranking defectors from the Soviet bloc are not furnishing valid information. Second, not able to acknowledge that strategy and associated tactics of a long-standing nature are a part of America's adversaries' normal way of thinking, they cannot accept strategic planning itself as valid. Third, there is an embarrassment factor of strong hidden and even subliminal dimensions associated with any realization that the Soviets may have the skill to manipulate events to their liking. The subliminal nature of this latter reason centers on whether America has been subjected to nuclear destabilization by virtue of the Soviets now possessing about ten times the nuclear explosive power of the United States, through the workings of detente and the arms control process, and whether the Soviets may be well on their way toward developing and deploying a "strategic surprise" which may jeopardize the future of the West. These unnerving thoughts will require a major policy decision--at least a requirement for future analysis.

5) SOVIET ELECTROMAGNETIC DEVICES

Insofar as it has been determined, there seems to be no official within the U.S. Government that is positioned in an authoritative way to assert whether or not the development and deployment of an apparently growing number of Soviet electromagnetic devices constitute a real threat to the security of the United States. The general response is that officials simply do not know, and presently do not have the capacity to know. Inherent in this kind of situation is, of course, the danger of a "strategic surprise" that can place the United States in an untenable position from which it may have difficulty recovering. Simple common sense and the lessons of history should indicate that Soviet activities are always directed toward a well-defined purpose: This is their well-documented policy and procedure--based on a strategic method of thinking.

In this particular field, a number of knowledgeable individuals, including present and former Government officials, have expressed the opinion that the Soviets are at least 10 to 15 years ahead of the United States. Some cite as evidence the fact that the United States has had to borrow Soviet ideas for our own directed energy research. It appears that one of the associated problems deals with mental attitudes in the U.S. scientific community, wherein there is a reluctance to entertain the thought that our

Soviet counterparts are ahead of us and for strategic purposes at that--conditioned as many U.S. scientists are to the belief that more U.S.-Soviet joint projects will resolve everything. The most fearful thought is expressed in the "Dead-Man Fuzing" thesis, whereby a reduction in nuclear weapons offers the possibility of bringing into play what might be referred to as Brezhnev's "secret weapon." This could also be expressed as the potential for a sort of "electromagnetic ambush" of the United States. It should also be borne in mind that certain parts of this picture may be deliberate attempts by the Soviets to condition the United States to accept "global peace" on Soviet terms. The message from certain segments of the scientific community is quite clear--this area, at a minimum, deserves much stricter scrutiny and review. This will require multiple policy decisions.

6) ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Disconcerting to most serious students of the history of the past 70 years is the remembrance of Lenin's "New Economic Plan" (NEP) and its similarity with current events. A convenient reference point is Dr. Armand Hammer, who is known to have had friendly relations with the Soviet leadership since Lenin's time. It is also recognized that he has had substantial access to the Reagan White House. It is also known that Michael Deaver's expressed avowed purpose

was to convince the President to bring about "peace" with the Soviets. It is also known that Deaver was a friend of Lillian Hellman, a known "Stalinist." It is also known that both Secretary of State George Shulz and Secretary of Commerce C. William Verity have a long-standing association with the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council in which one executive committee member is Yevgeny Pitovranov, an identified KGB lieutenant general. It is also known that Armand Hammer and Max Kampelman, the chief U.S. Arms Control negotiator, are personal friends. It is also known that Occidental Petroleum Corporation, of which Armand Hammer is the Chairman of the Board, and Combustion Engineering, Inc. of which Charles E. Hugel is the President, have recently entered into a \$25 billion joint venture with the Soviet Union. George F. Will has alluded to this kind of situation and the strange network of relationships in another way in an article entitled "Foreign Policy that Bewilders."

While the confluence of forces described above may be purely coincidental, the central question is whether arms control and trade policies have been "adjusted" for Armand Hammer's personal benefit, or for the benefit of the Soviet Union, or for what? There is another part of this concern that involves the totality of seemingly unrelated Soviet activities expressed in John Lenczowski's "The Soviet Price for Peace and Quiet"; the stationing of Soviet nuclear submarines off the American coasts; Soviet firing of nuclear

missiles over the North Pole toward the United States, and one missile toward the Hawaiian Islands; together with Soviet experimentation with mind control devices--which perhaps can affect individuals--even a U.S. President (1972 DIA report).

In addition, there is the apparent reluctance of the Secretary of State to clarify or disavow a 1962 State Department document: "Freedom from War: The United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." Soviet manipulation and deception in the arms control process simply cannot be discounted. What has happened in recent years appears to parallel the pattern with regard to the U.S. unilateral renunciation of chemical and biological warfare, and subsequent depletion of said stockpiles in 1969 only to discover that the Soviets had accelerated their work in that field. (Livingstone and Douglass, America the Vulnerable, pp. 52, 53.) This was a classic and well-documented case of successful Soviet manipulation and deception of U.S. leadership--a lesson we can ignore only at great peril to the nation's security.

7) THE U.S. DEFENSE PROGRAM

Under this highly contentious heading lies such thoughts on future force structure and requirements as expressed by James Webb, former Secretary of the Navy:

"national resources, changes in world economic structure, recent political changes and the improved capabilities of many of our allies dictate that we must, perhaps for the first time since the late 1940's, seriously debate the posture of the U.S. military around the world and the roles and missions assigned to our military services." Beneath this issue lies a host of ramifications and sub-issues such as military strategy and tactics, testing of weapons under combat conditions, procurement, budgets, training, force structure in Europe, Korea and the like--in fact, the whole "bag of worms" or "tar-baby," as one close to the current Administration described it--that come under the heading of the "rearming of America." There are a number of concepts and ideas that need to be seriously examined in depth before policy matters can be resolved, and the present Pentagon procurement scandal confirms such a need since it may be only the "tip of the iceberg." This area requires considerable attention and expertise. The Reagan Administration HAS achieved considerable gains during its tenure; however, as current problems indicate, there may be allegations that certain elements of the defense program have been "overlooked" and this could raise allegations of someone "being asleep while on their watch"

8) 'GLOBAL DEMOCRACY' AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

The term "global democracy" has been emerging in recent years as the possible main thrust of U.S. foreign policy. While the term no doubt derives from the Wilsonian concept of "making the world safe for democracy," it can also be equated with the original Marxist vision and even with the Soviet slogan of peace, justice and equality. This area requires further discussion and clarification so that the "abstraction element" is reduced to concrete meaning and all may clearly comprehend U.S. policy direction. The war of ideas, ideals and semantics is REAL--Mikhail Gorbachev has not denied the fundamental Marxist-Leninist tenets of the Soviet Union; in fact, he has strongly re-affirmed them--and the United States must be REALISTIC, and guard against the urge of some to "make the world safe for communism."

9) LEADERSHIP OF THE WEST

Leadership of the West deals with the future of the Western world and America's role in guiding it into that future. It requires addressing a number of interrelated questions: Does the United States have the political will as well as the resources to continue bearing the responsibility for the leadership of the West? If so, by what means shall this leadership continue to be effective? Will it be primarily a defense-oriented kind of leadership

that rests on the presence of U.S. forces in Europe? Does the U.S. President automatically become the political leader of the West, or is he merely a titular leader rather than a de facto one? Can we afford not to play such a role? To what extent will collaboration and coordination with our allies be conducted? Has the United States gotten into the habit of assuming it is defending "Western Civilization" without clearly defining what that term really means? Does "Western Civilization" mean the same thing as "Western heritage," and if so, does it mean cultural heritage or biological heritage, or both or neither of those? How does the U.S. know it is exercising effective leadership of the West? For instance, if the West Germans have decided that dealing with a relatively stable Soviet regime is better than dealing with a relatively unstable American administration as some reports suggest; and as indicated by Helmut Schmidt's suggestion of the Zero-Zero option (which might have been Soviet inspired); Conservative leader Franz-Joseph Strauss's assertion that the "cold war" is over; German bank loans to the Soviets in the amount of \$2 billion; etc.; how can the United States prevent a Soviet-German rapprochement that might conceivably end U.S. political influence in Europe? Has the current Administration made a strategic blunder and allowed its focus to be on piecemeal arms reduction rather than first insisting on a comprehensive political settlement with the Soviets? Would the United States consider acceptable a

reunification of the two Germanies and other developments which might allow for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe? Is the United States prepared to lead Europe toward a United States of Europe? Is this their own intention? What does the United States really want to see happen in Europe and how are our strategic interests affected for the short- to long-term range? In short, if we are to lead, in which direction will we proceed?

10) EAST-WEST STRATEGIC TRADE AND FINANCE

The central concern is whether the United States as leader of the West should or should not encourage such strategic and technological trade. Related to this is the question of whether the United States could, in fact, prevent the Europeans and Japanese from engaging in such trade with the Soviet Bloc even if we wanted to--and to what extent the Europeans and Japanese will cooperate in a coordinated effort (COCOM). The key policy decision will rest on the judgment of whether increased trade will "mellow" the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, or enable the Soviets to raise their economy and technology to a higher level of effectiveness so as to be able to renew hostile actions (overt and covert) in the future. Another view is that trade is simply trade and is politically neutral, and that we must be concerned with reliability of supply, etc. While this may be so; nevertheless, trade,

like all other inter-related matters, is a matter that falls within a broader framework of aims, purposes and goals. This means that increased trade depends on overall U.S. National Security Strategy, which is not clear on these matters. (What is the purpose? And what are the foreseeable short- and long-term results?)

Associated with the trade question is the technology transfer question. For years, it has been commonly assumed that the Soviets stole or otherwise obtained Western technology because they were so backward in certain areas. While this is generally true, it is not a completely accurate view relative to Soviet weaponry production. The "technology lead" which the United States has maintained over the Soviet Union during the past 20-25 years has declined from 10-12 years to 4-6 years; the U.S. "technology lead" in critical military technology, formerly 6-8 years, has been cut to 2-4 years. At the same time, U.S. weaponry procurement programs have been lengthened in terms of off-the-board design to deployment: Whereas the Polaris program took six years to go from design to full fleet deployment, it now takes 15+ years to design a new tank (M-1) or aircraft (B-1B). This critical factor CANNOT be overlooked because the Soviets are not technological Neanderthals--they have an abundance of scientists on the technological cutting-edge, and they work very hard.

Western technology is now used for comparison purposes, and to augment and advance those sectors in which the Soviets lag behind the West. The good ideas and devices are incorporated into Soviet weaponry only if they advance the effectiveness of the end product--the weapon--otherwise they are discarded. This allows the Soviets to clearly target Western technology according to their need. The stealing of technology is one measure of Soviet determination to advance beyond the West in a military-technological sense. Consequently, trade, technology transfers, and bank lending are all part of the larger U.S. strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. What will that U.S. "strategy" be in the years ahead?

11) U.S. - U.S.S.R. SPACE PROGRAMS

It is generally understood among knowledgeable experts and U.S. Government officials that the Soviets are attempting to achieve the military domination of space. Despite this, there is no evidence this factor has entered into the current arms reduction equation. The Soviets have enlarged their space launching facilities, expanded their payload capability, and increased their number of launch vehicles beyond any normal requirements insofar as U.S. intelligence and senior policy officials view these matters. What is this excessive Soviet capability for? And whatever happened to the "Fractional Orbital Bombardment System"?

Whereas the Soviet space program is essentially a military one, the U.S. space program is divided--with NASA being a "civilian" operation. What are the mysterious "glows in the sky" ("dome of light"--in Intelligence Community parlance) observed over the Soviet Union? Could they possibly result from devices which would present the United States with a "strategic surprise" and negate the effect of the proposed SDI system before it becomes operational? These are all areas of concern that require policy decisions which must be determined as part of an integrated U.S. strategy.

12) ANTI-COMMUNIST FREEDOM FIGHTERS

The "Reagan Doctrine" was assumed by many to have heralded a sustained effort to support anti-communist freedom fighters over the world. The condition of the Contras in Nicaragua raises concern that such an effort cannot be sustained with a high degree of certainty under current political conditions. There is certainly a high degree of concern about U.S. policy in Afghanistan, Mozambique, Angola, Central America (El Salvador and Nicaragua), and the Philippines. These are primarily "guerrilla" affairs--erroneously referred to as "low-intensity" conflict. Yet, for some unknown reason, it seems to have been assumed that intelligence officers of the CIA in their "covert operations" mode are somehow trained experts in guerrilla strategy and tactics, and can advise on

what is required for success. This situation raises a fundamental question: Are they indeed so qualified, and is the CIA the proper agency within the U.S. Government to handle such matters? The Soviets, and for that matter the Third World and our Allies, do not take the CIA seriously ("a sieve of leaks"), so why should the U.S. Government? Many high intelligence officials insist intelligence and policy are separate and should not be intermingled. Yet, a guerrilla war involves policy, or rather strategy and tactics; indeed, it also involves intelligence. The main question is whether the U.S. Government has organized itself for maximum effectiveness in this area. There is also the related question of whether the United States truly wants to be effective in this area.

13) EDUCATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Many observers have concluded the U.S. educational system does not produce the kind of officials and requisite training needed in the modern era of complex issues that comprise national security affairs. This is especially true in the field of national security strategy and related tactics. This lack of training extends even to within the ranks of the military academies and war colleges. Yet, there seems to be no official interest in correcting this situation despite the obvious failures in Vietnam and elsewhere. For instance, many U.S. officials are not even

acquainted with the basics of strategy as outlined by Sun Tzu around 400 B.C. This is an appalling situation.

Related to this is a condition that might best be described as "Marxism in the universities and high schools." How can the future leaders of America and the West be expected to comprehend the issues and the values involved if they are subjected to a system of thinking and education that is basically antithetical to that of the traditional West? How can a future Bush Administration obviate this problem?

14) INTERNAL SECURITY

It is a common perception among knowledgeable observers that for all practical purposes formal internal security is virtually non-existent within the United States in the conventional sense of the term. We have expanded the parameters of our free and open society to allow hostile nations--sworn to destroy us--to use the benefits of our open society to their advantage against us. We have allowed such opposition nations to directly partake in our participatory democracy and political process. For instance, some U.S. officials have noted that the hostile Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was able to mount a larger effort to influence the Congress in Washington, D.C. than could the Executive branch itself. The entire area dealing with the designation of security risks is politically explosive since even some Members of the U.S. Congress can

be considered to be in the category of security-risks by virtue of their past and present activities and associations (Crockett, Metzenbaum, Savage, Dellums, etc.). Refer to the article "The Congress's Red Army," by J. Michael Waller and Joseph Sobran.

REVEL'S CRITIQUE

The greatest concern over U.S. national security affairs revolves around the question of how to revitalize the national security system and process so as to overcome the limitations made evident in Jean-Francois Revel's critique of Western leadership in How Democracies Perish. This is a fundamental issue and calls for a clarification of precisely what is to be done. Related to this matter is Arnold Beichman's observations contained in the Spring 1988 edition of Policy Review of the Heritage Foundation, entitled "Know Thy Enemy":

Seventy years after the Bolshevik Revolution, the social cataclysm that introduced the politics of scientific heartlessness, uncounted millions of words in many languages have been written about the Soviet Union and about Lenin's revolution. It is, therefore, all the more astonishing to realize that most Western statesmen know little about the strategies of the Soviet Union for world conquest and the motor that drives those strategies--Marxism-Leninism.

In recent years an extraordinary number of first-rate books about the Soviet Union and Soviet-American relations by academics and journalists, some Westerners and some Soviet emigres, have been published. For an intelligent person today to be ignorant of the meaning of

Soviet intentions can only be seen as an act of willful zealotry. For a president of the United States to be that ignorant--President Carter is the classic example--should be grounds for impeachment, and for a presidential candidate to be so ignorant should be grounds for an overwhelming rejection by a nominating convention.

George F. Will

Foreign Policy That Bewilders

For conservatives, Ronald Reagan's foreign policy has produced much surprise but little delight. His fourth and, one prays, final summit is a suitable occasion for conservatives to look back with bewilderment and ahead with trepidation.

It is true, as some Europeans argue, that conditions are better in Europe, the region that remains the decisive prize in the East-West contest. Just 15 years ago there still were two dictatorships in Western Europe (both in the Iberian peninsula), terrorists seemed able to destabilize Italy and perhaps West Germany, and "Eurocommunism" seemed the wave of the future. Today the dictatorships are gone, terrorists cannot be decisive anywhere, and communist parties are withering away. But Reagan administration policies had little to do with any of this.

Furthermore, it is arguable that Reagan will leave U.S. security as precarious as it was in 1980. This is so for three reasons:

First, his deficits, combined with his success in making low taxes the crux of contemporary conservatism, have put in place a decade—at least—of pressure against defense spending. That pressure already has pushed defense spending into decline, in real terms, since 1985.

Second, Reagan's rhetoric has accelerated the nation's intellectual disarmament. In his seventh and eighth years, he has declared the Cold War over. He has done this by declaring that the Soviet regime had been readily transformed for the better by the sudden, inexplicable capture of it by a man (Mikhail Gorbachev) who supposedly is opposed to its 70-year-old expansionist tendency and rationale. That statement was bad enough.

But worse was Reagan's statement that the Soviet regime's inherent tendencies were not radically wrong until the regime was hijacked by Stalin. Stalin, said Reagan, was not, as conservatives believe, an intensification of Lenin, but was merely an aberration.

Third, by succumbing so fully to the arms control chimera, Reagan made it impossible to conduct a coherent conservative foreign policy.

Indeed, a case can be made for the proposition that, thinking only of U.S.-Soviet relations, a Dukakis presidency might be preferable to a Bush presidency of more Reaganism.

To allay foreign and domestic doubts about a Democratic president, and because he favors enhanced conventional forces, which are expensive, President Dukakis might propose a modest—say, 2 percent—increase in defense. George Bush might also. But a Democratic Congress, which is a certainty, would give a Democratic president his defense budget. It would cut Bush's.

Furthermore, when there is a Democratic president, it is possible to have cohesive conservative opposition to at least some arms control excesses. When a Republican is president, such opposition is impossible. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan may have been President Carter's pretext for withdrawing SALT II from Senate consideration. However, a sufficient reason for withdrawal was a block of at least 34 votes against it, enough to defeat it. A Democratic president was a necessary condition for such opposition, which is almost entirely Republican.

There is no reason to doubt that Bush would be as ready as Michael Dukakis is, or as ready as Reagan has been, to make arms control agreements the controlling aspiration of U.S. policy. That aspiration makes a coherent conservative foreign policy impossible, for reasons explained in Commentary magazine by Mary Eberstadt, a member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff between 1985 and 1987.

Consider, she says, the collapse of administration policy regarding Nicaragua. By 1987, the administration clearly was ready to make arms control the altar on which anything else would be sacrificed. By summer 1987, the contras were a sacrifice.

The argument for contra aid was grounded in an ominous interpretation of Soviet intentions in the world. By the end of 1987, the administration had abandoned the interpretation (had it ever been more than rote even to Reagan?) of the Soviet Union as possessing dangerous hegemonic aspirations.

Absent a connection with such aspirations, it does not matter all that much if there are, as Secretary of State Shultz has warned that there will be, "two, three, many Nicaraguas." Administration rhetoric about the peril of an unchecked Nicaragua was refuted by administration rhetoric about the new, transforming Soviet leadership that the administration assures us is searching for accommodation, as demonstrated in the arms control "process."

Either the arms control fixation or the contras had to go. The contras are gone. Noriega is not. These facts testify to the impotence, bred by incoherence, of Reagan's foreign policy.

FRANCE

The Case for Pessimism

A distinguished author sees little hope for the future of the West

Modern democracy may be nothing more than an "accident" whose time on the stage of world history is almost over. Its survival in the face of relentless Communist success is highly unlikely, and will be decided before the end of the century. The West will have no one but itself to blame for its demise.

Those bleak observations are not the distilled fantasies of the Kremlin. They are the benchmarks of reality, according to Jean-François Revel, 60, the distinguished journalist, iconoclastic philosopher and persistent gadfly of French politics. In his

Such attention is nothing new for Revel, a literary editor and columnist for the newsmagazine *L'Express* and its editor in chief from 1978 to 1981. His 1970 book in praise of American freedom of dissent, *Without Marx or Jesus*, outraged nationalistic French intellectuals of both the left and right. In 1976 he created another furor with *The Totalitarian Temptation*, a blistering condemnation of French Socialist tolerance of "vintage Stalinism."

In essence, *How Democracies Perish* takes up where *Temptation* left off. Revel now charges Western democracy as a whole with failing to recognize the reality of Communist, particularly Soviet, expan-

contest on the nature of democratic pluralism. "To totalitarianism, an opponent is by definition subversive," he writes, while democracy "treats subversives as mere opponents for fear of betraying its principles." The fundamental difference between the systems renders democracies inherently less capable than totalitarian regimes of defending themselves against internal enemies. That fact, he says, is ruthlessly exploited by the Soviets in their covert encouragement of global terrorism.


Externally, Revel argues, pluralism engenders a far more fatal tendency: "Democracy tends to ignore, even deny, threats to its existence because it loathes doing what is needed to counter them." In other words, democracy instinctively resorts to appeasement, usually justified as the encouragement of totalitarian "moderates" over "hard-liners." A French diplomat shortly after Munich, Revel notes, described Hitler as caught between Goebbels and Himmler [hard] and Göring [moderate]; Stalin wheedled concessions out of the Roosevelt Administration by warning that his liberal tendencies were under attack in the Politburo.

In much the same way, democracies view history with selective amnesia. As things are now... only the West's failures, crimes and weaknesses deserve to be recorded by history," says Revel, while totalitarian reality "is what Soviet leaders are preparing to do now" in the way of promised reforms or concessions. Memories of capitalism's Great Depression endure, while the deaths of millions during forced Soviet collectivization in the same period do not. Viet Nam remains fresh in the mind; the Marxist bloodbaths of Lieut. Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia during the late 1970s do not.

Finally, Revel points to the rise within Western democracies of an "industry of blame," bent on fostering a one-sided notion of historical guilt. According to those who hold this view, everything that is bad, especially in the Third World, results from forces in the "rich"—meaning capitalist—democracies. Thus any Western attempt to resist Communist aggression, as in Angola or Viet Nam, arouses intellectual confusion and paralysis. Says Revel: "There was a time when you were an imperialist if you invaded an alien territory and imposed on independent peoples an authority they rejected. Today, you are an imperialist if you oppose such aggression."

Revel offers disappointingly few cures for democracy's failing condition. Instead he quotes Demosthenes' advice to the Athenians: "Don't do what you are doing now." Revel then tersely suggests "genui detente," which amounts to meeting the reality of the implacable contest with Communism. Such a posture would require, he admits, "almost total Western intellectual reconversion" and "unprecedented" coordination among the democracies. Smaller wonder, then, that he does not expect it happen.

—By George Russ



Demosthenes among the Athenians: Journalist-Philosopher Revel in a Paris garden

A football game in which the West disqualified itself from going beyond the 50-yard line.

profoundly pessimistic view, the West is on the verge of losing its prolonged struggle for coexistence with Communism. But, Revel argues, "it's the case that's pessimistic, not the person stating it."

The inevitable defeat of Western democracy is the subject of Revel's newly translated work *How Democracies Perish* (Doubleday; \$17.95), which sold 200,000 copies after it was first published in France last year and remained on the bestseller list for 24 weeks. Historian Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie compared the significance of Revel's warnings about the Soviet Union to the alarms sounded by Demosthenes about the perils facing Athenian democracy. U.S. neoconservatives lauded publication of a condensation in the monthly *Commentary* last June; U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick quoted from the work in her speech to the Republican National Convention.

sion since 1917. According to Revel, Western "victories" in that struggle (the 1948 Berlin airlift, Korea) have never been more than temporary impediments to Communist aggression; totalitarian achievements (the Berlin Wall, hegemony in Eastern Europe) have been permanent. As Revel puts it, "The confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West [has] resembled a football game in which one of the teams, the West, disqualified itself from going beyond the 50-yard line."

Revel then asks a disturbing question: "Could Communism's expansionist strategy have succeeded so well unless the West was predisposed to succumb to it?" His answer: the success of Communism can be explained only because "the democracies themselves have adopted the Communists' image of the world and their perspective on history."

Revel blames the one-sidedness of the

JOHN LENCZOWSKI

The exercise of democracy in America has long shown that the people, once armed with the facts, can decide their own interests better than any authoritarian leadership could.

The supreme interest of the people, America's national security, depends precisely on the people's capacity to know the truth about any threats to their vital interests, and their leader's ability to tell it to them. The failure to tell the American people the truth consistently in the face of Soviet pressure to do otherwise is the central strategic error of this administration's foreign policy.

Recognizing this essential requirement of democracy, the Kremlin's principal strategy is to confuse Americans about the truth of Soviet global objectives. To a remarkable degree, it has succeeded. The controversy about the nature of the Soviet Union today and the degree of the threat it poses has prevented consistent coherent policy toward the greatest enemy of American democracy.

For all of Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's "reforms," which differ little from those of ear-

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The Soviet price for peace and quiet

lier eras, absolutely nothing has changed concerning the original, ideologically based and publicly declared purposes of the Communist regime — to overthrow democratic capitalism and transform the world into a Marxist-Leninist order.

Mr. Gorbachev has not renounced the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The forces that prevent him from doing so also compel him to pursue the program of international communism. Thus, the Marxist-Leninist declaration of protracted war against democratic capitalism still stands.

When Ronald Reagan began to dominate national politics during the 1980 campaign, he decried the ill consequences of diminished American power and its emboldening effect upon the Soviets, ayatollahs and assorted terrorists of the world.

He taught America the lesson all Soviet children learn: that communist morality is different from "bourgeois" morality; that right and wrong for the communist are determined not by the Ten Commandments or other "abstract norms" but by a purely pragmatic standard: Does something help or hinder communism?

The president's warnings re-

versed the decade-long decline in America's defense posture. Americans were hearing the truth about Soviet aims and recognized the need to counter Soviet plans for military superiority. In his first years, the president won his defense budget requests from Congress.

Moscow's response was to render a U.S. policy of sustained defense politically unacceptable to American politicians. It used a classic method — war propaganda: threats, warnings that America's defense buildup was increasing tension and the danger of war, intimidation of our allies, and the activation of a worldwide "peace" movement that depicted the president as a "warmonger."

The Soviet campaign succeeded, probably beyond Moscow's wildest dreams. In 1983, the administration initiated a policy of "intensified dialogue" with the Soviets. Bending over backward to show that Americans are not warmongers, it did nothing of consequence in response to the Soviet shootdown of Korean airliner KAL 007 or the Soviet murder of U.S. Army Maj. Arthur Nicholson. The president told reporters he would no longer be willing to characterize the Soviet Union

publicly as an evil empire.

Despite his 1980 campaign condemnations of a Carter administration "coverup" of Soviet arms treaty violations, the Reagan administration refused to publicize its findings of Soviet violations lest it be accused of derailing arms control. Not until forced to do so by Congress did it make the evidence known.

The message of the 1984 reelection campaign was that we had regained our strength, the threats had subsided, and we were at peace. Secretary of State George Shultz' subsequent meeting with the Soviet foreign minister to discuss summit plans evoked such excitement that Bryant Gumbel hosted NBC's "Today Show" from the meeting site in Geneva. In 1985, the summit ended with smiles, handshakes and agreements between the American delegation and the head of the formerly evil empire.

Detente and its euphoric "Spirit of Geneva" were with us again and the earlier defense consensus was evaporating.

In 1984, Congress cut the president's fiscal 1985 defense request by 6.4 percent. In 1985, the cut was 11.3 percent. And when the president submitted a reduced re-

quest next year, Congress cut it by 9.6 percent.

Meanwhile, the Soviets continued their military buildup with no "congressional" cutbacks. Even during the Reagan buildup the U.S.S.R. outpaced us not only in the quantity of most weapons systems but also in the quality of some. All along the administration had been justifying its defense requests not on the basis of this threat but to support its bargaining position at the arms talks. Yet, it appears mystified why these requests are savaged by Congress.

As the administration withheld the truth about Soviet behavior from the public, the Kremlin issued its reward: the intimidation campaigns subsided, the peace movement faded, and we were given an atmosphere of peace and quiet.

For this, the administration was willing to pay the Soviet's price: self-censorship. It is the price everyone who hopes to escape the Communist Party's sanctions must pay, including the people of the Soviet Union themselves. It is a practice which permits the lie to prevail. It is the most insidious form of appeasement. It does not happen as a single act, as in Munich in 1938; it seeps

gradually, cumulatively, into the entire fabric of foreign policy.


While we enjoy the atmospherics of peace and the reform-minded Mr. Gorbachev continues to reinforce his beachhead in Central America and send booby-trap toy bombs to disfigure Afghan children, the consensus for sustained defense continues to elude us. So does a foreign policy that will yield the substance of peace.

For years, pundits, diplomats, pollsters and other experts have been telling us that diplomatic success is defined by negotiations, treaties, summits and other "processes."

According to this thesis, if the Soviets beat war propaganda drums, our diplomacy has failed. But the truth is that loud threatening noises from Moscow are a sure sign that Western leaders are defending their countries properly and have the courage to tell the truth in face of the Kremlin's threats.

Living by the truth does not spare us unpleasantness. So long as the U.S.S.R. persists in its war of subversion, terrorism and proxy insurgency against the Free World, we will be compelled to choose between the atmospherics of peace and the substance of security.

Faced with this choice, let us hope our future leaders will not be tempted by Neville Chamberlain's model for achieving peace in our time.



*J. Michael Waller
and Joseph Sobran*

THE COUNTRY is said to be moving to the right, but you wouldn't know it by the Democrats. During the Reagan years they have moved sharply and quickly leftward.

The major media have largely ignored the change and in some ways have helped camouflage it. But it's palpable in myriad ways, nowhere more so than in Congress.

Alarming History of Congressman Crockett

Consider George Crockett. The elderly Detroit Democrat, elected to Congress in 1980 at the age of 71, has a long public record of Communist fellow-traveling. During the 1940s he was a law partner of Maurice Sugar, a Communist who had been booted

out of the United Auto Workers by Walter Reuther. In 1946 Crockett was a sponsor of the Civil Rights Congress, a Communist front, and at about that time he joined the National Lawyers Guild, cited by a Congress different from today's as "the foremost legal bulwark of the Communist Party." (Crockett later became vice president of the Guild.) Crockett often represented Communists in court and before congressional committees. In 1949 he was legal counsel for eleven Communist Party

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